The Death of Phyna’s Sister by a Dangote Truck: Any Legal Remedy for the Bereaved Family?
Editor’s note: In this piece, David Bassey Antia writes on the tragic loss of Phyna’s sister in a Dangote truck accident. He outlines the legal path her family might pursue, and its unsettling limitations.
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Life, by its very nature, is uncertain. It swings between moments of joy and the devastating shock of tragedy. Among its harshest realities is death - an inevitable guest that often arrives unannounced. One may be alive and well today, yet a single misstep on a road, a brief collision with a moving vehicle, may be enough to turn the happiness of a family into grief.
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This reality came home once again with the tragic death of Ruth Otabor, sister to the popular reality star, Phyna. Ruth had her leg amputated after being struck by a truck belonging to the Dangote Group. Three weeks later, on August 31st, she succumbed to her injuries.
From the beginning, Nigerians reacted with shock and outrage, first through social media outcry, then street protests, and eventually, public spats between influencers over whose interventions were genuine. But all theatrics have since been drowned in sorrow. What remains is the grief of a bereaved family - and the lingering question: what remedy does the law provide?
The legal nature of fatal accidents
Accidents, by definition, are unforeseen. As the Indian Supreme Court once observed in Union of India v. Sunil Kumar Ghosh (AIR 1984 SC 1737), an “accident” is a mishap that does not arise in the ordinary course of events. Fatal accidents, however, go further- they abruptly terminate a life not by natural causes, but by negligence or wrongful acts.
A Nigerian illustration is found in NEPA v. Mallam Muhammed Auwal. In that case, officials of NEPA negligently left live wires on the ground after disconnection. Despite several warnings, they failed to act until a 10-year-old boy, Mohammed Nazifi, was èlectröcuted to death. The court rightly held NEPA liable for that needless loss of life.
Death in law extinguishes legal personality. As the Supreme Court stated in Margaret Nzom & Anor v. S.O. Jinadu (1987), “dead men are no longer persons in the eye of the law.” But while the deceased cannot sue, the law does not abandon their dependants.
English common law once offered no remedy. The doctrine of actio personalis moritur cüm persona - a personal action dies with the person - meant that dependants of the deceased were left without redress. In Baker v. Bolton, Lord Ellenborough coldly declared: “In a civil court, the death of a human being cannot be complained of as an injury.”
This unjust rule collapsed under the weight of industrial accidents in 19th-century Europe, leading to Lord Campbell’s Fatal Accidents Act of 1846, which created a statutory right of action for dependants. Nigeria, inheriting this legal framework, now has fatal accident laws across its states. For instance, Section 1(1) of the Fatal Accidents Law of Akwa Ibom State provides:
“Whenever the death of a person is caused by the fault of another, and the fault is such as would (if death had not occurred) have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, then in every such case, the person who would have been liable if death had not occurred shall be liable in an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured.”
This provision, which is in pari materia with other fatal accident statutes across Nigerian jurisdictions, provides the legal foundation for compensating the families and dependants of persons whose deaths result from actionable torts, especially negligence.
Who may sue and what must be proved
A fatal accident claim is not a continuation of the deceased’s right to sue but a new and independent action for the benefit of dependants. The plaintiffs must show that the deceased was injured by the wrongful act or negligence of the defendant; that the injury led to death; that the deceased could have sued had they survived; that the plaintiffs are members of the immediate family; that they were dependent on the deceased; and that they suffered pecuniary loss as a result of the death.
The action is typically brought by the deceased’s executor or administrator, but it exists for the benefit of dependants—not the estate.
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Damages: The hard arithmetic of loss
Professor Imo Udofa, in his book, Law of Torts in Nigeria, asserts that,
“the primary aim of tort law is to provide compensation to individuals who have suffered injury or damage as a result of the acts or omissions of others.”
Accordingly, compensatory damages are meant to restore the victim, as far as monetary compensation can permit, to the position they would have occupied had the tort not occurred. This principle, restitutio in integrum, is the cardinal basis of awarding damages in tort law and distinguishes tortious remedies from those in contract, where compensation often relates to the benefit of the bargain rather than restoration.
However, the application of restitutio in integrum is markedly limited in cases of fatal accident claims. The reason is not far-fetched: the life of a human being, along with the incalculable value of their potential, cannot be accurately translated into monetary terms. No amount of compensation can bring the deceased back to life. Thus, in such instances, the concept of restoring the status quo ante is philosophically and practically unattainable. Rather than a true restitution, what is awarded is a measure of pecuniary loss, and the law, in its pragmatic wisdom, acknowledges this irreducible limitation.
Lord Wright’s oft-quoted dictum in Davies v. Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd([1942] AC 601. remains a leading exposition on this point. He stated:
There is no question here of what may be called sentimental damage, bereavement, or pain and suffering. It is a hard matter of pounds, shillings, and pence, subject to the element of reasonable future probabilities. The starting point is the amount of wages which the deceased was earning, the ascertainment of which, to some extent, may depend on the regularity of his employment. Then there is an estimate of how much was required or expended for his own personal and living expenses. The balance will give a datum or basic figure, which will generally be turned into a lump sum by taking a certain number of years' purchase. The sum, however, has to be taxed down by having due regard to uncertainties, for instance that the widow might have again married and thus ceased to be dependent, and other like matters of speculation and doubt.
In both Nigerian and Australian jurisdictions, pecuniary loss remains the central focus in fatal accident claims. Emotional loss, grief, or pain suffered by the survivors is not compensable under the traditional heads of damages. For instance, in Franklin v. South Eastern Railway Co (157 ER 448), the English court held that damages should be calculated based on the reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit from the continuance of life. Similarly, in the Nigerian case of Uko v. West African Portland Cement Co. Ltd (1973) CCHCJ 11), the court acknowledged the cultural reality that adult children in Nigeria often support their parents. The court observed:
“It is an obligation founded on filial piety and universally held sentiment... if Edemaka Udo had not died, he would have conferred some pecuniary benefit on his parents.”
In contrast, courts have been reluctant to award damages where the deceased is a young child, due to the speculative nature of any prospective pecuniary benefit. In Jenyo v. Akinreti(1990) NWLR (Pt. 135) 663, the court held that the death of a five-year-old girl did not occasion any measurable pecuniary loss to the parents, referring to the deceased as an "unavoidable burden and liability." Likewise, in Barnett v. Cohen [1921] 2 KB 461, the claim for damages following the death of a four-year-old boy was dismissed due to the uncertainties surrounding the child's future contribution to the family
Notably, the decision in Taff Vale Railway Co. v. Jenkins [1913] A.C. 1 shows that even a purely prospective loss—so long as it is reasonable—may suffice to ground an award. However, the stringent evidentiary burden renders this difficult in most child-death claims, particularly in common law jurisdictions.
Importantly, collateral benefits - such as insurance payouts are excluded from damage calculations. Section 3 of the Akwa Ibom Fatal Accidents Law expressly provides that insurance money, pensions, or gratuities arising from the death must not be deducted from damages awarded.
The way forward for Ruth Otabor’s family
Applying these principles, the family of Ruth Otabor may maintain a claim against the Dangote Group, provided negligence is established. They would need to prove that the accident was caused by the wrongful act or omission of the truck driver (and vicariously, the company), and that Ruth’s death directly flowed from it.
While no judgment can replace a life lost, the law offers financial compensation to help dependants bear the economic void left behind. It is a cold comfort, but a necessary recognition that wrongful deaths should not go unanswered.
In the end, Ruth’s passing is not merely a family tragedy; it is a national reminder of the duty of care owed by corporations that dominate our roads. The law cannot bring her back, but it can ensure that her family is not left without remedy.
David Bassey Antia writes from the Faculty of Law, Topfaith University Mkpatak.
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Legit.ng.
Proofreading by James Ojo, copy editor at Legit.ng.
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